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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN L. RAlVIPTON, Governor
of the State of Utah, and
the STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case
No.

v.

HAYEN J. IlARLOvV, President of
the Senate of the State of
Utah and LORIN N. PACE, Speaker
of the House of Representatives
of the State of Utah, et al.,

11725

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS
AND APPELLANTS
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by the State of Utah
and its Governor for a declaratory judgment that
Section 5 ( 1 > of Senate Bill 10 (Chapter 138, Laws
of Utah, 1969), passed by the 38th Legislature of the
1

State of Utah, is unconstitutimrnl and invalict 1·1.
as it purports to confer upon th(' Presiclrnt o!;
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repn·,e11 ,
tives power to appoint members to thr State' g11,1
of Higher Education.
DISPOSITION IN LO\\"ER COURT
The District Court, after hearing argunH'11t 01
considering memoranda submitted by tlw partit
filed its men10randum decision and c>ntf'rrd a jud;
ment declaring that said Sectio11 ) ( 1 i of Senate b11
10 is constitutional and valid in all respects. an,
denied all relief sought by plaintiffs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment all'
re1nan<l to the District Court with directions to entt
a judgn1ent declaring Section 5 ( 1 >, Sc>ua te Bill \1'.
unconstitutional and invalid insofar as it purpmi·
to confer upon the President of the Senate and th
Speaker of the House of Represc>ntativc>s pmwr J,
appoint men1bers to the State Board of Higher hll
cation and granting appropriate relief to plaintill·
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The 38th Legislature of the State of Utnh <'nilrtei'
Senat(' Bill 10, portions of ·which lwcanw dfectiY'
2

111

\lc1\

J ),

Jl)li9, with the remaining provisions be-

on July 1, 1969. The bill provides
[ill· a
Boa rd of l liglwr Education to control,
i!laiiagt• And <;upervise all public institutions of higher
('(:uca tio11 in the State> of Utah. Prior to enactment
0 [ Senate Bill 10, the various colleges and universities
thi·oughout the Stat<' were governed by boards of
prrents or trustees whose n1en1bers-other than those
1 Q
ex officio-were appointed by the Governor
Statutes providing
1\·ith the consent of the Senate.
for the creatio11 and functions of such boards of
1·ei.:e11ts or trustees \YCH' repealed by the bill.
: !llllillµ pffectiw·

Section S ( 1) of the bill provides:
"'The state board of higher education shall
consist of fifteen resident citizens of the
state, nine of whon1 shall be appointed by the
governor with consent of the senate. Three
members of the board shall be appointed by
the president of the senate and three members by the speaker of the house of representatives in the manner provided herein. Not
more than eight members shall, at any time,
he from one political party. In making appointmc>nts to the board, persons shall be
selected from the state at large with due consideration for geographical representation."
After plaintiffs filed their complaint in the District Court, and before the matter could be set for

3

hearing on plaintiffs' application for a J)rel 1'n1
injunction, the effective date arriv<>d for that portir·
of the bill providing for appoi11tn1ents to the boilr«
Imerndiately thereafter, defendants, Unrlow 01111
Pace, made appointments to the board. Subsequp 111
ly, plaintiffs moved for leave to amf'nd their con 1
plaint to add as defendants the six members dPsig
nated by the defendants. The motio11 was granthi
and the added defendants appeared in the action.
asserting the right to serve as members of the board

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 5C1) OF SENATE BILL 10 PASSEDB\
THE 38TH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
UTAH 'VVHICH VESTS PO"''ER OF APPOINT
MENT TO THE STATE BOARD OF HIGHER
EDUCATION IN MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE VIOLATES ARTICLE VII, SECTION 10.
CONSTITUTION OF UT AH, WHICH RESER\'£\
SUCH POWER OF APPOINTMENT TO TI-if
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE AND IS UNCOK
STITUTIONAL AND INVALID.
The povver of the governor of the State of Utah
to appoint state officers is found in Articlf' Vil, Settion 10, Constitution of Utah, which provides:
4

The governor shall nmninate, and by and
with the consent of the Senate, appoint all
:-tate and district officers whose offices are
rstablished by this constitution, or which
may be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided
for * * *"
The principal point of contention between plaintiffs a11d defendants, in connection with the above
provision is over the meaning of the words "whose
appointment * * * is not otherwise provided for
* * * ". Did the fran1ers of the constitution intend,
as defendants claim, that the legislature could pro·
\'icle for appointment of state officers by itself, its
members or others whenever it by law created a new
office or whenever the constitution is silent as to
the matter of appointment? Or, was it their intention
to provide, as plaintiffs contend, that the appointive
power is vested in the governor, as chief executive
officer of the state, except where the constitution
provides for a different method of appointment?
Much has already been said in this action about
whether the words "provided for" constitute a prepositional phrase, and if so, whether the phrase
relates to the noun "constitution" or to "by law";
vrhether or not the last clause is a dependent adjective clause; or whether or not the framers of the
constitution were familiar with the importance of

5

the vvord "herein.'' Plaintiffs suggest tlidt )lir'
analyses, while interesting and provouibw.
little help in solving the issue at hand. Crrtaiiil,
members of the constitutional convention wrre fc1mi
iar vvith the word '·herein" a1Hl used it Plsewltc·re 1,
the constitution. Obviously, tlw mcai1i11g o! :;cctiiJ,
10 would be inuch clearer had tlw)· used it
the \Yords ''except as othenvisc providcct'· liut il.
not clear and the lower court so found I)\ smiJ1:.
'·I am not prepared to say that Article \'I{ Scct11.':
10 of the Utah Constitutioll is plC1i1i. din·c! ,11 :,
unc:mbiguous.··
'

'

Defendants have stated, had tlw fn111HTs intendt,
the construction urged by pLiiu tiffs they
simply have stated ·'except as otlienvisl' lmwide,
herein.'' But it is more plausible to a rguc that lla:,
they intended to give the legislature tlw duthori!Y +,
provide for any or all future
tlw1
would have said "except as may be oth('rwise pt
videcl by law" or ''except as shall otherwis" be p:l1
vided." Instead, the present ve1·h '·is'' "''1' u<r
It \Voulcl seem then that tlH'Y \\'('!'(' rcfrrri11g lo .ii
present, that is the time when tlw coJ1stitutio11 '',I·
being drafted and consequently frlt no need to <1d
the word "herein."

11
'

This construction is supported by the foct thc1t il! 1
fran1ers of the constitution, in those i11sto11cr' 11 '
6

,.
1

liich they intendPd to coJJfer upon the legislature

· to supersedP provisions ill the original
die po'" 'J 1·
. .
.
-··t tI.CJ1l rx1Jresslv made such prov1s10ns subJect
u
'
J
t .c.('Lln 11 t IJ1·es1-rii;lio11,. 1Jrovisim1 7 or fixing "by
to :,l!r);l l '
·
'c

]d\\ .''

•

n

For example, Article VII, Section 20, provides:

.. The Governor, Secretary of Statf', _Auditor,
Trf'asurer, A ttorucy-Geueral, Superintendent
of Public -Instcucdon, and such other State
e:rncl district officers as n1_ay be p:·ovidecl for
ln· law, shall receive for their services
n.10nthly a compensotion as fixed by law.

*

*
1

*

*

*
*

*
*

emphasis ;-icldecl J.

*
*

*
*

*
*

*

*"

Additional examples of the framf'rs' adherence to the
\Yorcls ""by low" \vhen rPf Prri11g to future action by
tlie legidotu re are cit Pd in Append ix A belo"v.
In fact, even Article VII, Section 10, itself demonstrates that the framers distinguished references to
future action by using the vvords ""by la\\·." The last
sentence provides:

*
* *
*
*
*
*
* If the
officf' of st>crctary of state state auditor state
'
'
treasurer, attorney general or superintendent
of public instruction be vacated by death
.
.
'
res1gnat1011 or otherwise, it shall be the duty
of the governor to fill the same by appointment, and appointee shall hold his office

·' *

'

7

until his successor shall be elected and y 1
fied, as niay be by !au' provided.'· 1 emplui·a.i
011
added).
'
Inas1nuch as Article VII, Sect ion 10, avoids
language such as ""except as otherwise prO\ided b·.
law," or ''as 1nay otherwise be pn'scribed by the legj,
lature," or "as niay be fixed by law'' (or fails 1,
use the future verb ''shall") it sec'ms evident that th
language ''whose appointment * * * is not other
wise provided for," was intended to mean "not other
wise provided for in the constitution." 'Yards mer
in a constitution must be presumed to have brP1
carefully chosen so that each word 'vill have a meaning or to have been measured in such a way as 11
convey certain and definite meaning with
littlr
as possible left to implication. Behnke v. ,\'cic Jer. :·1
Highwa)- .1utlzority, 13 N.J.
97 A.2d G-t7 <1955'.
Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsz·ille, 21() Ind. 399.
N .E.2d 93 7 (1940). Further, each provision 5houl1l
be construed so as to hannonizc with all others wit 1
a view towards giving effect to each and every prn
vision insofar as it can be consistent with rnnstrw
tion of the instrument as a whole. 1(j CJ .S. (0111:
tutional Law §23 at 93 (19:5()).
1

1

Under the construction argued for by defrnda!lt,.
the legislature could just as logically take the po.;iti 01 '
that it could otherwise provide for the appoi11tnwn:
8

whose
offices arc established by the consti•
· J::-. ,--c,1·
1 a··' those
which mav
be created by
law.
tutIOll
\
.. .
•
•

.. ·c ' J . ,
ut u11 H LI s

l'lrnt the term '·by law" rders to futu1·c action of
the legislature was csta hlished in Stale e.r rel. Shields
1

_

Bari;er, )()Utah 11-1(). 1(,/ P. 2()'.2 l1'117>, which

.;aid:

.. \\lwt is meant by the expression ·as may be
esta blishecl by lavv' in the constitutional provision we have quot('d> To our minds the
expression admits of but one n1eaning, and
that is, iL in the judgment of the Legislature,
it hcrnmes 1lf'ressarv to establish courts in
ildthtion Lo thosP P1{umeratecl in the constitutional provision, then the Legislature may,
by lav\· duly passed, create such other courts
inferior to the Supre1ne Court as in the judgment of that lJocly nwy be necessary. To be
"established by law' nwans just what it says,
namely, by a law duly passed by the law
maki11g povver of this state. * * *"
Plaintiffs' suggested construction is reasonable,
inasmuch as the constitution does "otherwise provide
for'' the appointment or election of smne state and
district officers. For e>,:mnple, Article VI, Section 12,
permits each house of the legislature to choose its
own officers and employees; Article VI, Section 13,
permits the legislature to fi11 vacancies in either
house "in such manner as nrny be provided by law."
.\rt idr VII, Section 1, provides for election of the
executive offin'rs of the state; Article VII_ Section 11,
q

provides for an election to fill a vacaHcy i11 the offii
of governor; Article VIII, Section 3, proyides for tii.
selection of judges; Article' VIII, SC'ction H, implirdl·
provides for the election of justices of the peaci
Article VIII, Section 10, provides for election 1,
county attorneys and appointment of attorneys pt·
tempore; Article YIII, Section 1+, provides for "I'
pointn1ent of clerks and reporters; Article IX. Sh
tions 1-4, provides for election of congr<'ssjmrnl repr.
sentatives.
The extent of the governor·s powers to appoin
state and district officers, under Article YII, Secti111
1O, is one that does not appear to have been clecicle1
by this court. Such decision was not made in Sta/,
ex rel. Hammond v. litaxfield, 103 Utah 1. ll:
P.2d 660 ( 1942), so heavily reliPd upon
clefr111I
ants in the lower court.
In that case the 1941 legislature had crratrd
new body known as the Engineering
an 1
amended an earlier statute relating to the State Ruct1'
Commission, thereby providing for the tcrrninatio11
of tenure in office of the members of the St<.ite Hoai'
Commission. The act provided that members of th 1
11
Engineering Commission would serve as
the State Road Commission. ThC' previous!>' ap
pointed members of the State Road
1

10

·l t

\\'a f f all to action against persons
Commission to deterappo11· it c•d to the Fngineeri11g
· e thei· 1• ritrht
to hoJd office as mernbers, ex officio,
!lllll
b
nf the State Road Commission. The court held that
thr
of the legislature to tenninate the incumbency of persons appointed to a state office for
a fixed term d<:>pe11ded upon the purpose for which
tt'rrnination \Vas effective. Inasmuch as the legislature could create an office it could abolish it but,
it ::;aid, this must be a genuine abolition a11d not some1hing done under pretense. If it abolished an office
and put another in its place, with substantially the
duties, it would be a device to unseat the incumbent and beyond the pm\er of the legislature.
The court stated (and this is the language relied
upon by defendants):
i;niug

1

cl

'

l!UO

.. The courts are confronted vvith the principle
that the power to create an office being in
the legislature, ordinarily the power to
abolish it must also reside there. At one and
the same time the courts are confronted with
another principle that the pmYer to fill an
?ffice, at least if not otherwise provided for
m the act creating the office, is executive and
under a constitutional provision such as Art.
VII, Sec. 10, of our Constitution, absent at
least any contrary expression of the legislasuch power lies with the governor. This
bemg
case the legislature has no power
summarily to remove the incumbent."

11

The language generally recognizes that thi
power of appointment is an executive one belonginl
to the governor. The statement "at least if not other.
wise proivded for in the act creating the office" 1,
not even dicta. It was not necessary to the decision n!
the case, and merely shows that the court vvas 1101
considering the question involved in the present
but was leaving it undecided. This is evident by u(
of the words "at least" twice in the same sentence.
A detailed analysis of the case actually shows that it
supports the position of the plaintiffs rather than th,
defendants. Additionally, the court pointed out thP
necessity of maintaining the separation of power·
doctrine under the Utah Constitution, and said:
1

"On no other basis can the various concepL
of legislative power under constitutional pro
visions such as ours be reconciled or fitte1l
together with the power given the executiw.·
The only other cases which appear to touch o:'
the question are McCornick v. Pratt, 8 Utah 29-k J
P. 1091 (1892), Duncan v. McAlister, 1 Utah K
( 1873) and People ex rel. Dickson v. Clayton, 4 Ulal
421, 11 P. 206 ( 1886). The l\1cCornick case involve
a construction of the Organic Act of the Utah Trni
tory which provided:
1

1

1

11

"* * * The Governor shall nominate, anrl. bi
and with the advice and consent of thr

12

!:ltivr
_a]l. o!f,i,cers not herein
othenv1se provided for,
.\her noting that members of the board of trustees
. ·l c . ,,···icultural college were ''officers" within the
() ! l l (1 b'
. · cr of tlle Organic Act, the court held that a
l ll ('.Cl 111 11 b
;

wliicl1 designated persons to serve as trustees
\\(\:, invalid, but that the provisions establishing the
!:oard to be appointed by the governor and the legiscouncil vvere valid. The court also said:

·'• * the legislature has authority to create

a board of construction for the college, but
has no authority to appoint the members of
the board, if they are 'officers,' within the
meaning of the organic act."

Cases reaching a similar result were Duncan v .
.l!c.1/ister, supra, and People v. Clayton, supra, both
ol which recognized the right of the general assembly
tu create an office but not to fill it. Those cases, with
llcCornick v. Pratt, supra, would appear to be controlling on the issues presented in the instant case
t\cPpt for the fact that the Organic Act then in force
rlid use the word ''herein" in describing the appointing powers of the governor.
In their argument before the lower court defendants took differing positions with respect to use of the
''Ord "'hereiH" in describing the appointing powers
of the governor. They argued on the one hand that

13

the omission of the word from Article \'II • 's".Cl 1.[()j•
1O, rnust have been intentional and that thr le"i·
t
lature, therefore, 1nay provide by law for the appni 111
n1ent of officers. They argued, also, that Lhe p11 ,
vision was probably copied after the constitution 11
Colorado-or some other state-which seem, 1r
inconsistent with the intentional omission.
1

1.•r

Plaintiffs are inclined to agree with defel!dant·
second argument, that the provision was copied afte 1
that of a sister state and therefore omission of t]1,
word '"herein" has no particular significance in inter
pretation of the section. This finds support in tiJ,
reports of the proceedings of the Utah Constitutim1,,
Convention where there is i10 suggestion that elirn1
nation of the Y\'ord .. herei11" y,·as even co11sidPred b.'
the body. The absence of arguinent about or me11tir11
of elimination of ''herein" would seem to irnlicali
that the fran1ers of the constitution, adopting thl'
wording of similar constitutional provisions iu other
states, did not believe they were changing C'stablished
law. This is particularly so in light of the fact
the Pratt, 111cAlister and Clayton ca-;ps \\l'l'l' 11111
decided on the basis of the "·ord '"herein."
1

But even if we were to concede that
ol
the word "herein" was deliberate, the omission ol
the word gives scant support to a contention thal thl'
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.

. . of tJ·1e· c·onstitutio11
intended to confer upon
•
'
authority
to make appointments.
t f1e l 'na1"sfature
b,
,

i1i!!llCl

Jn light of the territorial and constitutional
I1L·storv. of Utah ' it would be logical to suppose that
the co.nvention elimi1rnted the word "herein" because

was il\\·are of provisions in existing territorial
,,tcitutes and the E1iauLing Act affecting the election
oi" appointment of the state officers. In Section 19 of
the Enabling Act (28 Stat. 107.1, for instance, the
it

following is found:

.. * * * *the State govt>rnment formed in pur-

suance of said constitution, as provided by the
constitutional convention, shall proceed to
exercise all of the functions of state officers;
and all laws in force made by said Territory
at the time of its achnission into the union
shall be in force in said State, except as modified or changed by this Act or by the constitution of the State; and the laws of the United
States shall have the same force and effect
vvithin the said State as elsewhere within
the United States."

This language strongly suggests that the fran1ers
of the constitution understood that there might be in
existence extra-constitutional provisions relating to
the appointment or election of certain state officers
and that a general provision in the constitution
\\"Ould he necessary to achieve continuity and avoid
gaps or lapses in the method of appointment and the
tenure of officers.
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As previously conceded, it is reasonable t<
. .J 'Lil
pose that the framers of the constitution knew thi
meaning of the word "herein.'' It is also reasonabi,
to suppose that they knew the difference Letwee,
present and future tenses. If the defendants' coii
struction is correct, there is no reason why the leg1,
lature could not also "provide for" its own appoin;
ment of all "officers whose offices are establish,
by this constitution."
Plaintiffs' argument about the significance 1,
the omission of "herein" is supported by the tern
torial Pratt, lVlcAlister, and Clayton cases, whicl1
were not decided on the basis of the word "herein
In People v. Clayton, supra, for example. the
issue was decided in the following language quotini
from an earlier Idaho case:
"All the powers intrusted to government in
the territories as well as the states are clivirle1I
into three departments: the executive. thr
legislative and the judicial. It is wisely pr0·
vided that the functions appropriate to cacJ:
of these branches of the government shall b1'
vested in a separate body of public servai1\i,
and it is apparent that the perfection oi tlli
system requires that the lines which separat 1
and divide these departments shall be clenrl1
defined and closely followed. It is also true.
as a general proposition, that the powers con·
fided by the fundamental law to one of
departments cannot be exercised hy
16

. \ml where, as in this case, the orga11:ic law
·ovHles that the governor, by and with the
. the 1eg1s
. 1at1ve
.
,pldvice and consent of
counc1·1
:hall appoint the territorial officers, we do
not think the authority can be delegated to
another body, and the governor thus divested
of his prerogative. If this can be done and
sanclionecl in one instance, it n1ay be in
othe1s, and by this method, or in the exercise
of the two-third legislative rule over the governor's veto, the executive may be deprived
of the appointing power vvhich congress has
wisely confided to the executive branch of
the Lerritorial government."
In view of this strong language, it is difficult
to see hovv the framers, if they wanted to alter executiYe powers, could safely feel that they vvere doing
so merely by omission of the word "herein."
The fact that the word "herein" is used in
Article V, Section 1, is of no significance in arriving
at a determination that the word was intentionally
omitted from Article VII, Section 10. Without the
use of the word such as "herein" or "in this constitution" the last clause in Article V, Section 1, would
have no logical meaning.
A number of cases support plaintiff's position.
Many of these deal with the problen1 on the broader
basis of the separation of powers doctrine, and will
generally be discussed under Point II belmv. Several
17

cases have, however, considered the meanino- 01·
I:'
P'
visions similar to Utah's Article \'II, Sert ioH 1o. L
example, North Carolina's constitution provided:
" ·The Governor shall nominate, ancl • •.
appoint all officers whose offices are estcil
lished by this Constitution, or, which shall i·
created by law, and vvhose appointments ,11 .
not othervvise provided for, and no such oil
cer shall be appointed or elected by the Ge
eral Assembly.' " N.C. CoNsT. art. III § 11
(1868), quoted in, People ex rd. Nicho/.1 1
l\JcKee, 68 N.C. 429, 433 ( 1873 l.
,
1

In the early North Carolina case of People er rt!
Nichols v. 111cKee, supra, the North Caroliua cou:i
held that the words '·vvhose appointments are 1111,
otherwise provided for" should be interpreted to mea1,
appointn1ents not otherwise provided for in the co11
stitution. After the decision in l\1cKee, the Norli
Carolina constitution was an1e11<led to eliminate th1
phrases "or which shall be created by law" and ··alll!
no such officer shall be appointed or elected by th1
general assembly." Subsequent North Carolina ca>t"
construed the amendment as having been made lo:
the purpose of permitting the legislature to
some appointments of officers. See for example.
State's Prison v. Day, 124 N.C. 362, 32 S.E.
( 1899) and State ex rel. Ewart v. Jones, 116 N.l
570,21S.E.787 (1895).
beC'n based upon particular legislative history, lull'
1
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I ,. i·iiw u1w11 the construction of the Utah conJt8
r
· t'
"1 1Ji·ovision but People ex rel. Nichols v.
-tltll ]UJl<•
l!c1'ff, supra, decided prior to the an1endn1ent does
, "i.icl in that case the court adopted the construcIiav e n
tif'tl contended for by plaintiffs.
•. 1 .

11111l

j

'

'

The district court, in its n1e1norandum decision,
invoked the principle that a state constitution is not
ll gnnrl of power but operates solely as a limitation
oti the legislature and an act thereof is valid when
the constitution coutains no prohibition against it.
Plaintiffs do not challenge Lhe doctrine but only the
l<mer court's basic pre1nise-that in the present case
there is no prohibition against the legislature making
(',\ecutive appoint1nents. As stated by Justice Larson
in his dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Hammond
Y. Maxfield, supra:

... * * So too the constitution is mandatory

that the executive department, as depository
of the executive power, shall exercise the
executive functions of government and perform the duties of carrying into operation
effect all acts passed by the legislature;
it shall transact all executive business and see
that the laws are faithfully executed. By this
grant of power the constitution prohibits the
exercise of these powers by the legislature or
the judiciary. * * *

"* * * I t is
. sometimes 1oosely said that all

power not expressly prohibited is vested in

19

the legislature. This statement is loose ,
· 1eac1ing.
·
Th e 1eg1s
· l atlve
·
nus
power 1 the ani
f:
.
U11
1aw ma k-u1g power,
as noted ahove. i,
the only power vested 111 the legislatur,1
\Vhile it has an exclusive monopoly in th
field, it has no pO\l\'er beyond the ,limits d:0
constitutional law making. * * *
"But the execution of the laws, carrying then:
into effect, enforcing and seeing to it tho•
the duties and obligations imposed by luw
are observed and perforn1ed and not
tive functions. They are in nature and bi
the express tern1s of the constitution exhu
tive functions. * * *" ( e1n phasis added 1.
The same thought was expressed ill State c.r rd.
Swoop v . .lteclzenz, 58 N.l\1. L '.265 P.2d 336 ( 19j-\.
where the court was considering the vali(lity of an
appointment of three district judges by reason of i
statute to increase the number of judges.
the right of legislative appointment the court quotrd
42 Am. Jur., Public Officers, §94 at 932 C19-t-2):

"* * * vvhere the Constitution makes the act o[

appointment an executive one, it cnnnot l.x
exercised by the legislature, nor can the lrg1slature rob the executive of such power b1
conferring it on an outside agency of its own
choosing."

The constitutional grant of the appointing
power to the governor should be construed as depriYing the legislature of that power, particularly with
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\\ Jwsc duti<'s Jie vvithin the ex-

, , ,

rcli'H'llC f

I (1 '

. I',' l

Such IJri11ci1ik of construction is recog-

.

.

, , cleri·
·Lmeut
ra tber than the leg1sla t1ve or
rcutl'i e
· c11
'UC H. W ,
J,

'

l · 1 ]' Cool(')- Cunsliiutional Limitations 215

1nzec 111
·
r.Sth ed. 1927):

'

.. * * * such po\\ ers as n re s pccially conferred

by the consti tutiou _upon
governor: or
upon auy other spec1f1ed office_r, the legi.slacaunot reqmre or authorize to be performed hy any otlwr officer or authority;
and from those duties vvhich the constitution
requires of him he ca1111ot be excused by law.
* * *,,

Defrmla11ts, uJ course, dispute this construction
dllcl whether resort be hafl to rules of grammar, rules
of statutory co1htitutional construction, or to the
rnses and authorities, countervailing principles come
mto play. It may well be that Article VII, Section
10, considered in isolation, is unclear as found by
the lower court. nut, if it is unclear, it cannot be
a case "expressly directed or permitted" \Yhen conin conjunction with the distribution of powers
dortri11c enunciated in Article Y Section 1 of the
'
'
Cut1stitution
l 1 tllh, and it is a cardinal rule of
constitutional constrnctiou that the instrurnent must
he ronstrued in the light of ·what was intended by
its framers. The mean in ho intended by the framers
must hr ascertairn'd from the whole of the instrument and in co11strni11g a particular section the court
21

may refer to any other section or provi'iion 111 ...
certain object, purpose or intention. Uniucniir,
Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408 ·1,
.'
P. 2d 348 ( 1956); S'pence v. Utah State 11gricut 1111 ,
College, 119 Utah 104, 22·3 P. 2d 18 (1910! ..\sll .
cussed below, the courts fron1 numerous jurisrlictiri·
have considered the question on this broader ]J8,
and have invalidated similar legislation benmse,
its conflict with the separation of powers doctriiH
Defendants' contention that since the consti;,.
tion is one of limitation rather than grant, the fa
that the legislature is not specifically prohibited fro:
making the appointments means they have authoni
to do so, is repudiated in Hansen v. Legal Seni1.1
Committee of the Utah State Legislature, 19 Lta1
2d 231, 429 P.2d 979 (1967). There is nothingi1
the constitution vvhich specifically proscribed tl
legislature from appointing a legal advisor eitllf'
This court held such proscription was implied b)· tli
provision making the attorney general the
advisor to the officers of the state.

1
•

1

POINT II
SECTION 5 ( U OF SENATE BILL I'
PASSED BY THE 38TH LEGISLATURE Ot
THE ST A TE OF UT AH "\i\THICH YES,!'
11
PO\VER OF APPOINTMENT TO THE Sl\
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llOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN lVIEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE VIOLATES
ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH WHICH PROVIDES FOR
THE SEPARATION OF PO\VERS OF THE
THREE DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT
.\ND IS CONSEQUENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.
,\part from the quf'stion of the express povver of

appoi11tment conferre<l upon the governor by the
Utllh Constitution, there is a fundamental objection
to defendants' exercise of the pmver to appoint members of the board of higher education.
A basic concept underlying the constitutions of
the United States and the several states is that the

legislative, executive, and judicial departments must
remain separate, and that one shall not infringe
upon or intrude into the powers or functions of
another. In the Utah Constitution this philosophy
b expressed forthrightly and mandatorily in Article
V, Section 1:
"The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive,
and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of power properly belonging to
one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the others,
except in cases herein expressly directed or
permitted."

23

Proper construction of the fon'going·
reciti'ti·e,. c111.
·
sideration of Article YII, Section 10, which
appointing power gcnPrally within tlw PXf'cuh
departn1ent, and Article I, Section 2G, '' hidt mcil;,
the provisions of the co11slitulio11 ··nwnclatory ill'
prohibitory" unless cleclan'd by e>.:press \\nn\-; to
otherv.·ise.
The tTnited States Constitution doc:; nut cont 0
an express provision for tht> separation of
Ii:•
the funclan1ental co11cept has 1011g LeC'n recug11iz1,
In Springer v. Government of I he Philippine lsla111i
277 U.S. 189, 72 L. Eel. 8+5,
S. Ct.
the court considered the power of the g0\e111u1 ,,
the Philippine Islands to appoint directors of cert0i·
governmental corporations. The general proYisiu:
of the Oi·ganic Act relied upon by the gon'rnor \\ii•

''* * * that the supreme power shall he m\P

1

in an executive officer, whose ufficictl tit'
shall be 'The Governor General of tlw Plii 11 '
pine Islands.' "

The Organic Act, however, gavC' to tJ1e
the authority to increase the number or dbolish il' 1
of the executive departments, or make
in the names and duties thereof as it may sec fit <ti''
11
provided for the appointrn<:>nt and 1TmoY<1l of 11
heads of the executive depart1nents b)' thC' l;n,er 1:11
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., 1 111 discussiuo
the powers of the legislature
·
h
. l
e hrlncl and the goyernor un the other, the
OH t 1e 011
'
t1enr1c1 ·

United StCTtes Supreme Court sc-1icl:

* * Some of our st<1te co11stitutions expressly
'}rovicle jn 011e form or anolhcr that the legislative, exec u;ivc <-1rnl judicial powers of the
governme1il sh;.dl be forever separate
distinct froi:1 ead1 oth<:>r. Other const1tut10ns,
including that ui the ULJited States, do not
codtain such au express provision. But it is
implicit in alt as a conclusion logically follo\'1 i11g from thP sepa ratioll of the several departments. * * * And this separation and the
consequent exclusive character of the powers
conferred u po11 eac li of the three departments
is basic and vital-not merely a rnattc1· of
g0Yernn1ent 1nec hanisrn. * * *

•·-+

"lt may be stated then, as a general rule
inherent in the Arnerican constitutional
system, that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred,
the legislature cannot cxf'rcise either executive or judicial powPrs.; the executive cannot
exercise either legislative or judicial power;

***

"lcgislatit. e pot'"'er, as distinguislwd from
e:recuii1'c pozvl'r, is tlze authority to make
lmcs, but not to enforce them or appoint the
agcnl.s charged ll'itlz the du1_1- of such enforcemozt. The latter arc c.recutii'e functions."
(emphasis added).
1

The ruun noted that tlw officers jn question were
charged\' jt11 lhe f''\'.C'nisc of l''\:PCUtiYC functions and
tlit>1-cfur(, rnulr1 Jtul 1," <1ppoi11tccl hv the legislature,

and that the enun1eration of the gover11or-generar
appointive powers was not exclusive inasmuch all
executive functions were vested directly in thf
governor-general or under his supervisiu11 and c1,11
trol.

v. United Stales, 272 U.S. 32, 71 L. £rl
160, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926), which involved the po\\tr
of the President to rernovc executive officers who har:
been appointed by aud with the advice and conse 111
of the senate, contains an extensive and informatiH
review of the debates in the constitutional comen
tion relating to the executive power of appointme111
and removal, and to the separation of powers. Iii
its review of the history of the constitutional con·
vention, the court said (272 U.S. at 116):

"* * * l\lr. Madison insisted that article 2 b1

vesting the executive power in the President
was intended to grant to him the power ol
appointment and removal of executive offi·
cers except as thereafter expressly provideu
in that article. He pointed out that one oi
the chief purposes of the convention was tu
separate the legislative from the executiYe
functions. He said:
'If there is a principle in our Constitution.
indeed in any free Constitution m?re
sacred than another, it is that which
separates the legislative,
judicial powers. If there is any pomt. 111
which the separation of the legislative
26

arid executive powers.
to be ma.intaincd ·with great caut10n, it is that which
relates to officers and offices.' 1 Annals
of Congress, 581. . . . As Mr. Madison
said in the First Congress:
'The powers relative to offices
partly
legislative and partly
The
legislature creates the office, defines the
powers, limiis its duration and annexes
a compensation. This done, the legislative power ceases. They ought to have
nothing to do Zl'ith designating the man
to fill the office. That I conceive to be of
an excculiTJe nature. Although it be qualified in the constitution, I would not
extend or strain that qualification beyond
the limits precisely fixed for it. We ought
alvvays to consider the Constitution with
an eye to the principles upon which it
was founded.
this point of view, we
shall readily conclude that if the legislature determines the powers, the honors,
and emolu1nents of an office, we should
be insecure if they were to designate the
officer also.'" (emphasis added).
The court took the position that the power to appoint and remove executive subordinates is part of
the "executive power," and that such power could
not be legislativP or judicial power as they are understood.

In Tucker v. State, Q18 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270
(19+1 ), tlw legislature sought to erode the powers of

the governor by placing a nurnber of boards, corn
.
missions, and departments under the jurisdiction ul
the secretary of state, state auditor, state 1reasurer.
and lieutenant governor, and giving separate adinin
istrative departments the pmver to appoint mill
remove their departmental officers. A separatr
statute abolished the state board of education aud se:
up a new board, four n1en1bers of which vvere to br
appointed by the governor, and four by the lieuten
ant governor.
In a lengthy and well considered opinion the
Supreme Court of Indiana held unconstitutional tl1e
legislation taking the appointing power from the
governor and giving it to other officers. Among
other things the court quoted a pertinent Indiam
decision:

"* * *

A departn1ent without the pmver to
select those to whom it must intrust part of
its essential duties cannot be independent.
If it must accept as 'ministers and assistants,·
as Lord Bacon calls them, persons selected for
them by another department, then, it i.i
dependent on the department which
the selection. * * *"

This court further pointed out:
"The appellants say that if it had been intended to confer the appointive power upon
the Governor, a few appropriate words would
have sufficed to do so. But Constitutions arr
28

concisely drawn and superfluity is avoided.
lt was generally understood that the grant of
executive power carried with it, among other
things, the general power of appointment,

* * *"

The court rejected argunrnnts that a provision
thaL officers whose appoint1nent is not otherwise provided for in the constitution should be chosen in the
manner now or thereafter prescribed by law, conferred upon the legislature the power to make
appointments. Such construction was seen as creating inconsistencies in the constitution which could
not be permitted.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
refused to let the legislature exercise appointing
powers which properly belong to the executive department. In In re Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass.
615, 21 N.E.2d 551 (1939), the court held invalid
a statutory provision permitting the legislature to
participate in the choosing of four commissioners of
representative districts. The court said:
"The power (to provide for the naming and
settling of all civil officers) which * * * is
conferred upon the General Court is very
broad * * * but its scope must be determined
in the light of other constitutional provisions,
including the provisions of art. 30 of the
Declaration of Rights that 'the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive * * * powers.' "
29

After quoting fron1 an earlier case that 'ti
k
power to appoint and the power to remove officer,
are in their nature executive powers," the court
added:
''\Vithout implying that the General Cow,
niay not by fixed law confer the power 0;
the men1bers of boards of special
cornnuss10ners upon the people or upon thi·
General Court acting under its constitutional
power to 'name and settle' * * * civil officen
* * *-questions -vvhich are not presented b1
the bill under consideration-it is enoucrh tu
say that in our opinion the power of
ing members of such boards is so far executive in nature that it cannot be conferred b1
fixed law upon such purely legislative officeb
as senators and representatives, acting in any
manner other than that prescribed by the
Constitution for action by the General Cowi
without violating the provisions of art. 30 ol
the Declaration of Rights. * * *"
In another In re Opinion of the Justices, 301
Mass. 605, 19 N .E.2d 807 (1939), the court helO
that the president of the senate and speaker of the
house of representatives did not have power to ap·
point members of a commission, saying:
"We are of the opinion, however, that the
power of appointing such members canno!
be conferred by law upon the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, whether or not such mem·
hers are required to be chosen from among
30

the members of the Senate and of the House.
'The power to appoint and the power to
remove officers are in their nature executive
powers.' ( citin_g
of
this general pnnople is not impaired by the
fact that the Constitution explicitly empowers
the GPneral Court 'to name and settle annually * * * all civil officers within the said
con1n1onvvecdth,' * * *

'· * * * vve are of the opinion that to confer
upon such purely legislative officers the executive power of appointment of members of
the commission or committee provided for
by the bill and an amendment thereto,
whether or not such members are required to
be chosen frorn among members of the General Court, would be violative of said art. 30
as authorizing the legislative department to
exercise executive powers. See People v.
Tromaine, 252 N.Y. 27, 43-45, 56-60, 168
N.E. 817."

In State v. State Office Building Commission, 185
Kan. 563, 34:3 P.2d 674 (1959), the Supreme Court
of Kansas had under consideration legislation which
created the state office building commission and required the governor to appoint members of the legislature to serve on the commission. This requirement
was held to be invalid because in contravention of
the Kansas Constitution, which prohibits any of the
three branches of the government from exercising
the povvers of another branch. The court noted that
thr legislative power is the authority to make laws
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but not to enforce thern and that the powers of thr
commission in this case were executive powers.
In State ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde, 121 lud. 20 11
' ..
N.E. 644 (1889), the Supren1e Court of Indian,
struck down legislation giving the legislature pom1
to appoint a director of the departn1ent of geolog:i
and natural resources created by statute. This wa)
done after the court held Article XV Section 1 ol
the Indiana Constitution, similar to our Article VU
Section 1O, does not give the legislature the power
to appoint but only to prescribe the manner of
pointment. Referring to the constitutional provision
for separation of powers, the court recognized that
some offices, related to its functions, might be fillea
by the legislature adding:
"But the appointment to an office like the one
involved here, where it is in no manner connected with the discharge of legislative
duties, we think involves the exercise of executive functions, and falls within the prohibition * * * of the constitution."
In State ex inf. Hadley v. Washburn, 167 Mo
680, 67 S.W. 592 (1902), the Supreme Courtol
Missouri annulled legislation establishing a class of
persons from whom the governor was required to
make appointments for a particular position, holding
that the legislation violated the separation of powen
32

provision of the state constitution.

Referring to a
constitutional provision that appointments of officers
not otherwise directed were to be made in such
manner as might be prescribed by law, the court
said:

''* * * That section expressly authorizes the

general assembly, acting within its legislative
rnpacity, to pass a law prescribing the manner in which an appointment shall be made,
but it does not authorize the general assembly
to make the appointment itself, nor to
authorize anyone unconnected with the
goverment to do so. To provide by law the
manner in which an appointment shall be
made is one thing, to make the appointment
is another; the one is in its nature the legislative, the other is essentially executive. The
constitution authorizes the legislature to do
the one but not the other. * * *

"The act of filling a public office by appointment is essentially an administrative or executive act, and, under the constitution, can
be exercised only by an officer charged with
the duty of executing the laws. There is,
however, an exception to this rule which does
not conflict with the meaning of article 3.
Courts and the general assembly may appoint
such officers or agencies, not otherwise appointed by law, as are necessary to the exercise of their functions. * * *"

In Hlittler v. Baumgartner, 180 Neb. 446, 144
N.vY.2d 62 ( 1966), an act which unduly restricted
33

field frmn
the governor might make D/J
pmntments of directors of a grid system was held Ii:
..
the Supreme Court of Nebraska to be un 1011
.
11t11
tional because in violation of the separation
powers provision of the const i tu tiou. Quoting frun,
an earlier case, State ex rel. Hensley v. Plasters ·
'11
Neb. 652, 105 N.W. 1092 C1905J, the court said:
11

''Again there can be no doubt that the Leu/,
lature, after it has established an office, m\
the act of establishing it, may provide foi
filling the office either by election by thr
people or in a proper case by appointment Ir.
some designated authority. The Legislature
however, cannot itself fill the office. It can
not elect or appoint the officer (citing case1
and it seems to us to follow that it cannot b1
direct legislation for that sole purpose caw
an office to be held for the term, or am
period of the term, by any particular indi
vi dual * * *"
The court recognized the povver of the legislatmr
to prescribe reasonable qualifications for the perso!1
to be appointed to an office but held that the legi)
lature could not appoint officers whose offices arr
created by law, either directly or indirectly.
The extent to which legislative appointments l'
prohibited by the provisions of Article V, Section I.
and Article VII Section 10 of the Utah Constitutior'
'
'
has never been directly ruled upon by this court
34

.. ±·elf ..,c we haYe been able to find. The question
l] ])(}

(D

of ihe right to make appoiutnwnts was touched upon
w the case of Lee v. S Late, 13 Utah 2d 15, 36 7 P .2d

861 ( 1q62), which involved validity of enactment of

constitutional arnendn1ent granting temporary
r-rnergenC) powers to the legislature. In discussing
the provisions of the amenclmen t the court pointed
om that it gave the kgislature power to provide
temporary succession to the povvers and duties of
public officers, remarking that it pertained "to the
executive department uf our state government, its
powers, duties, and qualifications of its officers." The
court noted that one of the an1endments was to
'make it possible for the legislature instead of the
executive officer to provide for temporary succession
for public offices where the incumbents have become
unavailable."
l\

The amendments were held unconstitutional and
different amendment was subsequently passed
\Vhich implieclly recognizes that it is ordinarily the
governor's prerogative to make appointments. See
l 'r \lT CONST. art. VI § 32.
The constitution of Arizona is less restrictive than
Utah's and the Supreme Court of Arizona has held
th 0 t the legislature has quite extensive power with
respect to appoi11trne11ts. Yet even this court, and
others like it, recognize that there are some limits
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upon such legislative power, and that the ai .
· Jpou11
ments made by it should somehow be related t
0 lJe
1
legislative function. In Dunbar v. Cronin 18 1 .·
'
.1111
583, 164 P. 4.+7 (1917), the court upheld somelegb
lative appointments and reviewed cases from otliPi
states. The court said:

''* * * A revievv of the cases bearing upon thi

subject would see1n to indicate a come11sus o'1
opinion where the office is peculiarly ident\
fied or associated vvith the appointing power.
as where it has to do with the functions anr!
duties of the appointive power, whether it br
judicial, legislative, or executive, the appoi111
ment properly belongs to that department.''

The limitations on the part of the legislature to
both enact and assist in the execution of laws wa1
recognized by the Supreme Court of South Carolina
in Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District, 2\1
S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d 88, 173 A.L.R. 397 C1947l, which
involved appointments to an auditorium boar<l. The
statute provided that two of the nlembers of the
board would be the representative and senator from
the county in which the district was located. In
holding the statute to be unconstitutional the Su·
preme Court of South Carolina relied upon a constl·
tuutional provision essentially the san1e as Article Y,
Section 1, of the Utah Constitution. See also Spartan·
burg County v. Miller, 135 S.C. 348, 132 S.E. 6/3
( 1924).
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· lP from the question of the power to appoint,

,\ SIC

a large number of cases have dealt with the gerenal

propusition that legislative, executive, and
functions must be separate. Among those are Kzmball
v City of Grnntsuil!P, 19 Utah 368, 5 7 P. 1 (1899);
Stockmen v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 2'4', 129 P. 220 ( 1912),
in which au act establishing a legislative investigatino- committee was held unconstitutional as a "clear
b
and rnnspicuous instance of an attempt by the general assembly to confer executive power upon a collection of its own members''; Giss v. Jordan, 82 Ariz.
132, 309 P.2d 779 ( 195 7), invalidating a law purporting to exempt per diem and mileage for legislators from a provision requiring presentation of
claims to the state auditor.
Plaintiffs do not contend that the foregoing
decisions are necessarily based on constitutional provisions identical to either Article V, Section 1, or
Article VII, Section 10, of the Utah Constitution. Nor
do they contend that the cases standing alone are
dispositive of the issues presented in the present case.
The decisions clo, however, under factual situations
involving similar attempts to infringe upon the executive power of appointment, ( 1) illustrate the context in which Article VII, Section 10 must be considered, and C:2) establish that the consensus of
opinion in the United States is toward proscribing
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executive appointment by persons otlwr than
department entrusted with executive functloi,
Moreover, they portray the nature of the clifficultii
that could transpire if excursions intu tlw execuiti
reahn by the legislature are not prevented, aucl tlw.
show that there are two distinct provisions of tli
Utah Constitution which preclude defendants, n01
low and Pace, as n1en1bers of the legislature. fr 111
rnaking executive appointments.
11

The district court, in its n1e1noraudum decisioi.
found that plaintiffs had not pointed to auy clear-(UI
seci:ion of the constitution which prohibits the leg),
lature from doing the acts of which plaintiffs con1
plained. Plaintiffs submit that Article VII, Sectioi.
10, is such a provision; standing alone, the sectioi.
may not seem absolute, but when read in conjunctior
with Article V, Section 1, there can be no doubt Om
says the executive (the governor) shall make ap
pointments to state office. The other says
neither of the other departments shall exercise all\
powers properly belonging to the executive, excep1
where expressly directed or permittted. There 1'
nothing in the constitution expressly authorizing thP
legislature to make such appointments, thus it j,
prohibited from doing so, and as observed previoush
the lower court did not interpret the A1iicle YI:
language to be express. The only provision which
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1

.. ,
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tlw· lf>gislature
to appoint officers is Article
· -

\'I, Section 12, which provides: "Each house shall

determine t}w rules of its proceeding and choose its
,,,
officers and employees.'' lVIoreover, the pro0 11
Jn!Jitioll 11 rrd not be clear-cut or express. It may be
irnplircl. L'niuersit_r of Utah v. Board of Examiners,
iupra. dnd /\imball v. ('it_1· of (;rantsl'ille, supra.
The district judge apparently felt that what the
lcgisl;iture hnd doIJe here was not too had since it
appointed only six of the fifteen rnernbers, and the
governor was permitted to appoint the other nine.
He did not feel tlrnt it constituted an "alarming
i11cursion" of the legislative departn1ent into the
powers of the executive (although he was not so certt:iu i1bout iuroads recently made into the judicial
department>. But the question cannot be resolved
011 the Lasis that the legislature has made only a
little e11croachment. If the court tells the legislature
that it is all right for the1n to appoint six out of
fifteen members, what is to prevent them from api11lin ting nine and the governor six, or to prevent
tllem from appointing all of the n1embers and the
g(Jvernor 11011eJ If they can appoint six, nine, or
fifteen membPrs to the State Board of Higher Education, by the same reasoning they can appoint all state
officers. In tlrnt case, of course, Article VII, Section
HJ, n-ould bP completPly e1nasculated.
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If the defendants' construction of that pro\'· .

bl1111

is sanctioned, the legislature could ··othenvise prr
vide for" appoint1nents to all state ancl district office.
by persons other than the governor. lf ·such " pr,

cedent were established what \Voulcl
a ho 1:111
legislature from doing exactly what tht• Indirin,
legislature did in Tucker v. State,
The i1 11
trict judge's impression of that case, thot thr leg;,.
lature sought to abohslz the powei·s of the gowrnui.
is entirely correct. Should this court adopt the n111
struction contended for by defendants, hm\ cuulri
it distinguish from a situntion where the legislatu 11
ah(ilished all appoint1nents of the governor if 1•
should try to do so in the future? Plaintiffs submu
that it could not logically do so. But if it should nm.
Article V, Section 1 ·would be down the drain
with Article VII, Section 10.
A recognition of this fact ·was 1nade in
v. Legal Services Committee of the Utah State Leg11
lature, supra. This court, in halting a legislatiYr
excursion into the area of legal services stated:
"Always there are they who want to change
our government for one reason or another
If the legislature, by fiat, could create its mn
legal advisor, then logic would say it coulc
create 50 or more others for itself, each ol
which, of course, would have to have se.cre
taries and other personnel. * * * We behen
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the framers of the constitution had
·ntention in 1nind under our tn-part1te
1
system of government. "
Even if it should be conceded that the legislature
some leeway in providing for the filling of
infrrior administrative or executive offices by some
rnrans other than the gubernatorial appointment,
appoinlment may not be made by the legislature
itself. To permit the legislature to appoint or designate certain of its members to appoint executive
officers in their uncontrolled discretion, is a patent
lhrcat to representative government. To whom can
the people look for recourse in the event of poorly
;ulvisc<l appointment? The people as a whole do not
elect the president of the senate or speaker of the
house. This cannot be a government wherein "all
politirnl power is inherent in the people."
The defendants' citation in the lower court of
numerous acts wherein the legislature ostensibly
'rnthorized appointment of state officers by persons
tJthcr than the governor is without legal significance.
For one thing, many of these acts provided for only
nominations or recommendations to the governor
ancl the governor ma<le the final appointment. In
other cases, appointment of an ex officio type are
made arnl generally the acts involved only counc;ils
or hoards with advisory authority 011ly. In any event,
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f'ven if the legislature did encroach UJlon P\, .
( Clii11
powers in the past it is not entith•d to do s() llrJI',
This vvas in fact rccug11izf'd uy the cl istrict court
111
its memorandum derision.

1

"It is contended 'that the fact. thr1t simi]u,
bef'n
and ucrnmp
t1ve inchcates a practical co11structio11 uf tli
constitution which affords sanction f(\i' tli.
legislation * * * The rule of pral'rical
struction is of no valuP \vlwn it is ploin 1Ji
the practice has been in opP11 violation "
the iustrunwnt \\·hich the court is cnlkr
upon to construe.' ''
0

POINT III
SECTION 5(1) OF SENATE BILL 10
THE 38TH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE Of
UTAH IN REQUIRING SENATE APPROVAL Of
THE GOVERNOR'S APPOINTEES, BUT
THOSE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SEN.\11
AND SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE IS DISCRnt
INA.TORY AND VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SEC
TION 23, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. .\\fl
THE "EQUAL PROTECTION" CLAUSE Of
AMENDMENT XIV, OF THE CONSTITLTIU\
OF THE UNITED STATES.
Not content with usurping executive funrtio111.
the legislature, in drafting Section 5 ( 1) of the Bill.
went even further. It provided that the nine appoint·
ments to be made by the governor \Yotild be "iii
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the couscnt of the senate, but required no consent
by anyone as to the appoint1nents to be made by the
prrsidcnt of the senate and the speaker of the house.
Nu cumplc1int can be made concerning the requirernc;it for
con'.;ent to the governor's appointment.::? since such consent is required in the constifo1· execuliY{' appointments generally. Howr>.ci·, 'lll allow the "legislative''' appointments to be
nH'lc bY two jrnlivid11nls who CJ.re not answerable to
the· senate, or indeed to anyone else, is discriminatory
<rnd yiolates ,\rtirle 1, Section 2+, Utah Constitution,
,, hich provides th0t "All lmYs of a general nature
shail
unifonn operation."

Couple(l with the requiren1ents of selection with
regard to geography, political affiliation, and senate
cousenL the legislative povYer of appointment could
well deprive the governor of effective use of the
pmver to appoint "'his" nine nlembers of the board.
ft cut tld result in partisanship, favoritism, and political cronyism of tlw \Yo1·st sort-some of the things
Llw \Hiteis of the constiLution sought to eliminate by
providing for sc11atorial coufirrnation of executive
appoiutmeats. This almw should result in the court
ikiiig frurn the art provisions allowing appointment of mern lwrs of the boarcl b.Y the president of
tlie sPnate and s1waker of tlw how;t'.
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Article I, Section 2+, has frequentlv bee _
.
·
II Cu11
s1dered by this court and it has always held that di
criminatory and arbitrary
classifirntions cannr,
stand. There can be classification, awl tlwre ca< lJ )I
1
differentiation, but there must be a reaso11"ble
l
'
n
for distinction. See e.g., Roe v. Salt Lake City,
Utah 2d 266, +3 7 P. 2d 19:5 ( 1968); Justice v. Stand
ard Gilsonite Compan;-, 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.2rl
974 (1961); Gronlund v. Salt Lake Citr, 113 Ct<i!
284, 194 P. 2d 46+ (1948).
.

1

VVhat reasonable basis can there be for cxempti 111
the president's and speaker's appointments from thr·
requirement of senate consent. It couldn't be thal
they are more "representative of the people" than
the governor. As pointed out above, the gowrnor
represents the people of the entire state, but a mem
her of the senate or house does not. Neither J)
answerable to the people as a whole.
No reasonable distinction can be based upon th('
fact that the president of the senate and the speaker
of the house are themselves members of the
lature. The speaker, of course, has nothing to do
with the senate, and the president is just one membri
of that body. It cannot be presumed that their appointments vvould be more acceptable per se to
senate as a whole than would be the appointmenb
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of

goverllor. Can a reasonable basis for the distinrUun be found in the fact that the speaker and the
[ll·eside11t
from the opposite political party than
thcit of the governor? It is suggested that this questiPll ans\Yers itself; hesicles, it may not always be so.
There is no reasonn ble basis for the exemption, the
act is discriminatory and arbitrary and this court
,:110ulcl not allow it to stand.
llH'

A feature of the act making the exemption from

senatorial co11finnatio11 inure intolerable is that providing that no more than eight men1bers shall at any
one time be from one political party. Such a provision would not ordinarily be objectionable but inasmuch as the legislative appointments need no confirmation and the governor's do, there is nothing to
prevent the president and the speaker from appointing "acceptable" n1embers of the opposite party thus
forcing the governor to make practically all his
appointments from his opposite party or at least from
one party. Since his appointments must, under the
act, be made '"'ith the consent of the senate, the president and the speaker could effectively control the
stilte hoard of higher education.
Apart from "uniform operation," it is impossible
to read the provisions of Section 5 ( 1), Senate Bill 10,
without getting an uneasy feeling that fundamental
principle has been ignored.
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This feeling arises largely frmu recogniti
.
1
the president of the senate and speaker of the l
·
are not '"state officers" in the accepted sense· tl.
' ld1
the constitution refers to "presiding officers" of tlii
legislative branches; and that the ··presiding officer)·
are not chosen by the legislative representatives o:
the people as a whole but by those identified \iitli
that political party \Vith a majority of senators 01
representatives.
Voters at large are not being represented equally
The legislation in question (and other legislatio11 lih
it.
in vogue in the state) favors the
of one group of voters over another, and gives onr
political party an unequal voice in determining tht
composition and character of an important publi(
board. Although the problem is somewhat differeni
from that of determining the composition of the leg·
islature itself, Senate Bill 10 does deny "equal pru·
tection" to all the voters of the state, and should be
held unconstitutional on that ground.
In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663.
82 S. Ct. 691 ( 1962), the Supreme Court of the United
States said:

"* * * A citizen's right to a vote .free ol

arbitrary impairment by state act10n
been judicially recognized as a right secured
by the Constitution * * *"
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CONCLUSION
The provision of Section 5 ( 1 ) , Senate Bill 10, conferring upon the senate president and house speaker
the povver to appoint members of the state board of
higher education, contravenes the state and federal
constilutions and portends continuing excursions by
th':' 1Pgislature into the executive and judicial
domains.
In the first place, the legislation infringes upon
pmYers expressly conferred upon the governor by
.\rtide VII, Section 10, Utah Constitution, to appoint
those state and district officers (particularly those in
the executive branch of the government) whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for in
the constitution.
In addition, the legislation violates a fundamental principle of constitutional government, anouncecl in Article V, Section 1, of the Utah ConstituLion which provides that the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of the government shall forever
remain separate ai1d distinct, and that no one of
them shall perfonn the functions of the other. It
violates Article I, Section 23, Utah Constitution, in
that it is discriminatory and makes distinctions without any reasonable basis. It is contrary to the "equal
protection'' clause of Aniendment XIV, United States
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Constitution, in that iL gra11ts to lllPllllH·rs· of,cl ·
political party an arbitrarily dPlPrmin"(I
·
·
' g-rea\·
voice iu tlw govenrnwnt of our institutions of h'
.
1g;1
1
le'anung. :\ncl. as suggestl'd by the d1·ci-.i 011 l,
\Iassachusetb SuprPllll' Judicial Court in thf· ()fJl·, I/Iii·
of tlzc Justices, citl'd supra, PH'n if tlw appointii
power may constitutionally hP exPrcisPd by
the le•n,.
.
lature it must bP done h.v legislativP actio 11
than
uncontrullPd dPlPgation to t\Yo ol ih llHt
lwrs.
•

()

I[•

If the lPgislature is permittf'd tu arrogatf' to ih:
th(' power to appoint rnemlwrs of tlw board ,
higher education, there is no n•asun to suppo'e.
will not, in the future, f'XtPnd its pmwr into a1
branches and kvels of tlw gon•n1mPnt, and mah,
appoi11tnH•11ts of la\v clerks, court clerks, reporter·
deputy state officers. and administrative
to thf' governor. By exf'rcisf' of its appointing po\\t'
it will bf' able to do
with the classical
tion of powers and participate fully in all aspe<t'
state governn1ent.
1

In l/ansen v. /,egal Scn·iccs Committl'C of th 1
Utah State Legislature, supra, this court halted a lef
islative sally into the area of legal servicPs. Thi
extent of litigation in this gPrwral arf'n illustrate,
hO\v true are tlw words of this court,
then
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they * • •" ThC' framers too could foresee "they"
ancl by Articl<' I, Sectio11 27, intuitively provided:

Jlf'

··Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual
rights and tlw perpetuity of free governnicnt."
Section 5 ( 1 > of S<>11ate Bill 10 must be declared
unconstitutional and invalid.
Rcspectf ully submitted,

SIDNEY G. BAUCOM
A ttorne:v for Plaintiffs

APPENDIX A
Article VI, Section 21, relating to removal
officers; Article VII, Section 1, relating to duti.
officers; Article VII, Sections 13 , 14, and 15 relat·
'
Ii·
to the composition of the board of examiners, boa:
of insane asylum commissioners, and board of refon.
school commissioners; Article VII, Sections 16, 1i, 1•
and 19, relating to the duties of the secretary of sta1,
auditor and treasurer, attorney general and supcrii
tendent of public instruction; Article VIII, Section i
relating to establishment of inferior courts; ArticJ,
VIII, Section 9, relating to appeals from decisions
justices courts; Article VIII, Section 1O, relating 1
duties of county attorneys and other attorneys pri,
vided by the legislature; Article VIII, Section 14
relating to duties of the supreme court clerk an,
county clerks; Article VIII, Section 20, relating 11
salaries of judges; Article IX, Section 2, relating ti
ratios for legislative apportionment; Article XI, Ser
tion 1, relating to subdivisions of the state; Artid
XVI, Section 2, providing for establishment, prescri[i
tion of duties, and compensation of the board ol
labor, conciliation and arbitration; Article XIX
Section 2, relating to reformatory and penal insti·
tutions and those for the benefit of the insane, blind.
deaf and dumb; and Article XXIV, Section 8, relatillf
to seals of courts.
I
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